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On the set-generic multiverse
Sy David Friedman ∗, Sakae´ Fuchino † and Hiroshi Sakai ‡
Abstract
The forcing method is a powerful tool to prove the consistency of
set-theoretic assertions relative to the consistency of the axioms of set
theory. Laver’s theorem and Bukovsky´’s theorem assert that set-generic
extensions of a given ground model constitute a quite reasonable and
sufficiently general class of standard models of set-theory.
In sections 2 and 3 of this note, we give a proof of Bukovsky’s theorem
in a modern setting (for another proof of this theorem see [4]). In section
4 we check that the multiverse of set-generic extensions can be treated
as a collection of countable transitive models in a conservative extension
of ZFC. The last section then deals with the problem of the existence of
infinitely-many independent buttons, which arose in the modal-theoretic
approach to the set-generic multiverse by J.Hamkins and B. Loewe [12].
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1 The category of forcing extensions as the set-theoretic
multiverse
The forcing method is a powerful tool to prove the consistency of set-theoretic
(i.e., mathematical) assertions relative to (the consistency of) the axioms of set
theory. If a sentence σ in the language LZF of set theory is proved to be relatively
consistent with the axioms of set theory (ZFC) by some forcing argument then
it is so in the sense of the strictly finitist standpoint of Hilbert: the forcing
proof can be recast into an algorithm A such that, if a formal proof P of a
contradiction from ZFC + σ is ever given, then we can transform P with the
help of A to another proof of a contradiction from ZFC or even ZF alone.
The “working set-theorists” however prefer to see their forcing arguments
not as mere discussions concerning manipulations of formulas in a formal system
but rather concerning the “real” mathematical universe in which they “live”.
Forcing for them is thus a method of extending the universe of set theory where
they originally “live” (the ground model, usually denoted as “V ”) to many
(actually more than class many in the sense of V ) different models of set the-
ory called generic extensions of V . Actually, a family of generic extensions is
constructed for certain V -definable partial orderings P. Each such generic ex-
tension is obtained first by fixing a so-called generic filter G which is a filter
over P, sitting outside V with a “generic” sort of transcendence over V , and
then by adding G to V to generate a new structure — the generic extension
V [G] of V — which is also a model of ZFC. Often this process of taking generic
extensions over some model of set theory is even repeated transfinitely-many
times. As a result, a set-theorist performing forcing constructions is seen to live
in many different models of set theory simultaneously. This is manifested in
many technical expositions of forcing where the reader very often finds narra-
tives beginning with phrases like: “Working in V [G], . . . ”, “Let α < κ be such
that x is in the α th intermediate model V [Gα] and . . . ”, “Now returning to V ,
. . . ”, etc., etc.
Although this “multiverse” view of forcing is in a sense merely a modus
loquendi, it is worthwhile to study the possible pictures of this multiverse per
se. Some initial moves in this direction have been taken e.g. in [1], [2], [5], [6],
[7], [8], [11], [12], [21], [24] etc. The term “multiverse” probably originated in
work of Woodin in which he considered the “set-generic multiverse”, the “class”
of set-theoretic universes which forms the closure of the given initial universe V
under set-generic extension and set-generic ground models. Sometimes we also
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have to consider the constellations of the set-generic multiverse where V cannot
be reconstructed as a set-generic extension of some of or even any of the proper
inner models of V . To deal with such cases it is more convenient to consider
the expanded generic multiverse where we also assume that the multiverse is
also closed under the construction of definable inner models.
The set-generic universe should be distinguished from the “class-generic mul-
tiverse”, defined in the same way but with respect to class-forcing extensions
and ground models, as well as inner models of class-generic extensions that
are not themselves class-generic (see [5]). It is even possible to go beyond class-
forcing by considering forcings whose conditions are classes, so-called hyperclass
forcings (see [6]). The broadest point of view with regard to the multiverse is
expressed in [7], where the “hyperuniverse” is taken to consist of all universes
which share the same ordinals as the initial universe (which is taken to be
countable to facilitate the construction of new universes). The hyperuniverse is
closed under all notions of forcing.
In this article we restrict our attention to the set-generic multiverse. The
well-posedness of questions regarding the set-generic multiverse is established
by the theorems of Laver and Bukovsky´ which we discuss in Section 2. These
theorems show that the set-generic extensions and set-generic ground models of
a given universe represent a “class” of models with a natural characterization.
The straightforward formulation of the set-generic multiverse requires the
notion of “class” of classes which cannot be treated in the usual framework of
ZF set theory, but, as emphasized at the beginning, theorems about the set-
generic multiverse are actually meta-theorems about ZFC. However we can also
consider a theory which is a conservative extension of ZFC in which set-generic
extensions and set-generic ground models are real objects in the theory and the
set-generic multiverse a definable class. In Section 4, we consider such a system
and show that it is a conservative extension of ZFC.
The multiverse view sometimes highlights problems which would never have
been asked in the conventional context of forcing constructions (see [11]). As one
such example we consider in Section 5 the problem of the existence of infinitely
many independent buttons (in the sense of [12]).
2 Laver’s theorem and Bukovsky´’s theorem
In the forcing language, we often have to express that a certain set is already in
the ground model, e.g. in a statement like: p ‖–P “ . . . x˙ is in V and . . . ”. In
such situations we can always find a large enough ordinal ξ such that the set in
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question should be found in that level of the cumulative hierarchy in the ground
model. So we can reformulate a statement like the one above into something
like p ‖–P “ . . . x˙ ∈ Vˇξ and . . . ” which is a legitimate expression in the forcing
language.
This might be one of the reasons why it is proved only quite recently that
the ground model is always definable in an arbitrary set-generic extension:
Theorem 2.1 (R. Laver, [17], H.Woodin [23]). There is a formula ϕ∗(x, y) in
LZF such that, for any transitive model V of ZFC and set-generic extension
V [G] of V there is a ∈ V such that, for any b ∈ V [G]
b ∈ V ⇔ V [G] |= ϕ∗(a, b).
An important corollary of Laver’s theorem is that a countable transitive
model of ZFC can have at most countably many ground models for set forcing.
Bukovsky´’s theorem gives a natural characterization of inner models M of
V such that V is a set-generic extension ofM (1) . Note that, by Laver’s theorem
Theorem 2.1, such an M is then definable in V . However the inner model M
of V may be introduced as a class in the sense of von Neumann-Bernays-Go¨del
class theory (NBG) and in such a situation the definability of M in V may not
be immediately clear.
Let us begin with the following observation concerning κ-c.c. generic exten-
sions. We shall call a partial ordering atomless if each element of it has at least
two extensions which are incompatible with each other.
Lemma 2.2. Let κ be a regular uncountable cardinal. If P is a κ-c.c. atomless
partial ordering, then P adds a new subset of 2<κ.
Proof.Without loss of generality, we may assume that P consists of the positive
elements of a κ-c.c. atomless complete Boolean algebra. Note that P adds new
subset of On since P adds a new set (e.g. the (V,P)-generic set). Suppose that S˙
is a P-name of a new subset of On. Let θ be a sufficiently large regular cardinal
and let M ≺ H(θ) be such that
(2.1) |M | ≤ 2<κ;
(2.2) <κM ⊆M and
(2.3) P, S˙, κ ∈M .
Let T˙ be a P-name such that ‖–P “ T˙ = S˙ ∩M ”. By (2.1), it is enough to show
the following, where V denotes the ground model:
(1) In the terminology of [8], M is a ground of V .
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Claim 2.2.1. ‖–P “ T˙ 6∈ V ”.
⊢ Otherwise there would be p ∈ P and T ∈ V , T ⊆ On such that
(2.4) p ‖–P “ T˙ = Tˇ ”.
We show in the following that then we can construct a strictly decreasing se-
quence 〈qα : α < κ〉 in P ∩M such that
(2.5) p ≤P qα for all α < κ.
But since {qα · −qα+1 : α < κ} is then a pairwise disjoint subset of P, this
contradicts the κ-c.c. of P.
Suppose that 〈qα : α < δ〉 for some δ < κ has been constructed. If δ is a
limit, let qδ =
∏
α<δ qα. Then we have p ≤P qδ and qδ ≤P qα for all α < δ. Since
〈qα : α < δ〉 ∈ M by (2.2), we also have qδ ∈M .
If δ = β + 1, then, since M |=“qβ does not decide S˙” by the elementarity
of M , there are ξ ∈ On ∩M and q, q′ ∈ P ∩M with q, q′ ≤P qβ such that
q ‖– P “ ξ ∈ S˙ ” and q
′ ‖– P “ ξ 6∈ S˙ ”. At least one of them, say q, must be
incompatible with p. Then qδ = qβ · −q is as desired. ⊣ (Claim 2.2.1)
(Lemma 2.2)
Note that, translated into the language of complete Boolean algebras, the
lemma above just asserts that no κ-c.c. atomless Boolean algebra B is (2<κ, 2)-
distributive.
Suppose now that we work in NBG, V is a transitive model of ZFC and
M an inner model of ZFC in V (that is M is a transitive class ⊆ V with
(M,∈) |= ZFC). For a regular uncountable cardinal κ in M , we say that
M κ-globally covers V if for every function f (in V ) with dom(f) ∈ M and
rng(f) ⊆ M , there is a function g ∈ M with dom(g) = dom(f) such that
f(i) ∈ g(i) and M |= | g(i) | < κ for all i ∈ dom(f).
Theorem 2.3 (L. Bukovsky´, [3](2) ). Suppose that V is a transitive model of
ZFC, M ⊆ V an inner model of ZFC and κ is a regular uncountable cardinal
in M . Then M κ-globally covers V if and only if V is a κ-c.c. set-generic
extension of M .
As the referee of the paper points out, this theorem can be formulated more
naturally in the von Neumann-Bernays-Go¨del class theory (NBG) since in the
(2)Tadatoshi Miyamoto told us that James Baumgartner independently proved this theorem
in an unpublished note using infinitary logic.
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framework of ZFC this theorem can only be formulated as a meta-theorem,
that is, as a collection of theorems consisting corresponding statements for each
formula which might define an inner model M .
Proof of Theorem 2.3: If V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension of M , say by
a partial ordering P ∈ M with M |=“P has the κ-c.c.”, then it is clear that
M κ-globally covers V (for f as above, let f˙ ∈ M be a P-name of f and g be
defined by letting g(α) to be the set of all possible values f˙(α) may take).
The proof of the converse is done via the following Lemma 2.4. Note that,
by Grigorieff’s theorem (see Corollary 2.6 below), the statement of this Lemma
is a consequence of Bukovsky´’s theorem:
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that M is an inner model of a transitive model V of ZFC
such that M κ-globally covers V for some κ regular uncountable in M . Then
for any A ∈ V , A ⊆ On, M [A] is(3) a κ-c.c. set-generic extension of M .
Note that it can happen easily that M [A] is not a set generic extrension
of M . For example, 0# exists and M = L, then M [0#] is not a set-generic
extension of M .
We first show that Theorem 2.3 follows from Lemma 2.4. Assume that M
κ-globally covers V . We have to show that V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension
of M . In V , let λ be a regular cardinal such that λ<κ = λ and A ⊆ On be a set
such that
(2.6) (P(λ))M [A] = (P(λ))V .
Then, by Lemma 2.4, M [A] is a κ-c.c. generic extension of M and hence we
haveM [A] |= “κ is a regular cardinal”. Actually we haveM [A] = V . Otherwise
there would be a B ∈ V \M [A] with B ⊆ On. Since M [A] κ-globally covers
M [A][B], we may apply Lemma 2.4 on this pair and conclude that M [A][B] is
a (non trivial) κ-c.c. generic extension of M [A]. By Lemma 2.2, there is a new
element of P((2<κ)M [A]) ⊆ P(λ) inM [A][B].But this is a contradiction to (2.6).
(Theorem 2.3)
Proof of Lemma 2.4: We work in M and construct a κ-c.c. partial ordering
P such that M [A] is a P-generic extension over M .
(3) M [A] may be defined by M [A] =
⋃
α∈On L(V
M
α
∪ {A}). M [A] is a model of ZF: this
can be seen easily e.g. by applying Theorem 13.9 in [13]. If M also satisfies AC then M [A]
satisfies AC as well since, in this case, it is easy to see that a well-ordering of (Vα)
M ∪ {A}
belongs to M [A] for all α ∈ On.
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Let µ ∈ On be such that A ⊆ µ and let L∞(µ) be the infinitary sentential
logic with atomic sentences
(2.7) “α ∈ A˙” for α ∈ µ
and the class of sentences closed under ¬ and
∨∨
where ¬ is to be applied
to a formula and
∨∨
to an arbitrary set of formulas. To be specific let us
assume that the atomic sentences “α ∈ A˙” for α ∈ µ are coded by the sets
〈α, 0〉 for α ∈ µ, the negation ¬ϕ by 〈ϕ, 1〉 and the infinitary disjunction
∨∨
Φ
by 〈Φ, 2〉. We regard the usual disjunction ∨ of two formulas as a special case
of
∨∨
and other logical connectives like “
∧∧
”, “∧”, “→” as being introduced as
abbreviations of usual combinations of ¬ and
∨∨
. For a sentence ϕ ∈ L∞(µ)
and B ⊆ µ, we write B |= ϕ when ϕ holds if each atomic sentence of the
form “α ∈ A˙” in ϕ is interpreted by “α ∈ B” and logical connectives in ϕ are
interpreted in canonical way. For a set Γ of sentences, we write B |= Γ if B |= ψ
for all ψ ∈ Γ. For Γ ⊆ L∞(µ) and ϕ, we write Γ |= ϕ if B |= Γ implies B |= ϕ
for all B ⊆ µ (in V ).
Let ⊢ be a notion of provability for L∞(µ) in some logical system which is
correct (i.e. Γ ⊢ ϕ always implies Γ |= ϕ)(4) , upward absolute (i.e. M ⊆ N
and M |= “Γ ⊢ ϕ” always imply N |= “Γ ⊢ ϕ” for any transitive models M ,
N of ZF) and sufficiently strong (so that all the arguments used below work
for this ⊢). In Section 3 we introduce one such deductive system (as well as
an alternative approach without using such a deduction system, based on Le´vy
Absoluteness).
Let λ = max{κ, µ+} and Lλ(µ) = L∞(µ)∩ (Vλ)
M . Let f ∈ V be a mapping
f :
(
P(Lλ(µ))
)M
\ {∅} →
(
Lλ(µ)
)M
such that, for any Γ ∈
(
P(Lλ(µ))
)M
\ {∅},
we have f(Γ) ∈ Γ and A |= f(Γ) if A |=
∨∨
Γ. Since M κ-globally covers
V , there is a g ∈ M with g :
(
P(Lλ(µ))
)M
\ {∅} → P<κ
(
Lλ(µ)
)M
such that
f(Γ) ∈ g(Γ) ⊆ Γ for all Γ ∈ (P(Lλ(µ)))
M \ {∅}.
In M , let
(2.8) T = {
∨∨
Γ→
∨∨
g(Γ) : Γ ∈ P(Lλ(µ)) \ {∅}}.
Note that M [A] |= “A |= T”. It follows that T is consistent with respect to our
deduction system (in V ). In M , let
(2.9) P = {ϕ ∈ Lλ(µ) : T 6⊢ ¬ϕ}
and for ϕ, ψ ∈ P, let
(4)More precisely, we assume that ZFC proves the correctness of ⊢.
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(2.10) ϕ ≤P ψ ⇔ T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ.
Claim 2.4.1. For ϕ ∈ Lλ(µ), if A |= ϕ then we have ϕ ∈ P. In particular,
“α ∈ A˙” ∈ P for all α ∈ A and “¬(α ∈ A˙)” ∈ P for all α ∈ µ \ A.
⊢ Suppose A |= ϕ. We have to show T 6⊢ ¬ϕ: If T ⊢ ¬ϕ in M , then we would
have V |= “T ⊢ ¬ϕ”. Since A |= T in V , it follows that A |= ¬ϕ. This is a
contradiction. ⊣ (Claim 2.4.1)
Claim 2.4.2. For ϕ, ψ ∈ P, ϕ and ψ are compatible if and only if
(2.11) T 6⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Note that (2.11) is equivalent to
(2.12) T 6⊢ ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ (⇔ T 6⊢ ϕ→ ¬ψ).
⊢ Suppose that ϕ, ψ ∈ P are compatible. By the definition of ≤P this means
that there is η ∈ P such that T ⊢ η → ϕ and T ⊢ η → ψ. For this η we
have T ⊢ η → (ϕ ∧ ψ). Since T 6⊢ ¬η by the consistency of T , it follows that
T 6⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Conversely if T 6⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ). Then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ P. Since T ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ and
T ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ψ, we have (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≤P ϕ and (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≤P ψ. Thus ϕ and ψ are
compatible with respect to ≤P. ⊣ (Claim 2.4.2)
Claim 2.4.3. P has the κ-c.c.
⊢ Suppose that Γ ⊆ P is an antichain. Since | g(Γ) | < κ, it is enough to
show that g(Γ) = Γ. Suppose otherwise and let ϕ0 ∈ Γ \ g(Γ). Since “
∨∨
Γ →∨∨
g(Γ)” ∈ T and ⊢ ϕ0 →
∨∨
Γ, we have
(2.13) T ⊢ ϕ0 →
∨∨
g(Γ).
It follows that there is ϕ ∈ g(Γ) such that ϕ0 and ϕ are compatible. This is
because otherwise we would have T ⊢ ϕ0 → ¬ϕ for all ϕ ∈ g(Γ) by Claim 2.4.2.
Hence T ⊢ ϕ0 →
∧∧
{¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ g(Γ)} which is equivalent to T ⊢ ϕ0 → ¬
∨∨
g(Γ).
From this and (2.13), it follows that T ⊢ ¬ϕ0. But this is a contradiction to
the assumption that ϕ0 ∈ P.
Now, since Γ is pairwise incompatible, it follows that ϕ0 = ϕ ∈ g(Γ). This
is a contradiction to the choice of ϕ0. ⊣ (Claim 2.4.3)
In V , let G(A) = {ϕ ∈ P : A |= ϕ}. By Claim 2.4.1, we have G(A) = {ϕ ∈
Lλ(µ) : A |= ϕ} and A is definable from G(A) over M as {α ∈ µ : “α ∈ A˙” ∈
G(A)}. Thus we have M [G(A)] = M [A].
Hence the following two Claims prove our Lemma:
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Claim 2.4.4. G(A) is a filter in P.
⊢ Suppose that ϕ ∈ G(A) and ϕ ≤P ψ. Since this means that A |= ϕ and
T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, it follows that A |= ψ. That is, ψ ∈ G(A).
Suppose now that ϕ, ψ ∈ G(A). This means that
(2.14) A |= ϕ and A |= ψ.
Hence we have A |= ϕ∧ ψ. By Claim 2.4.1, it follows that (ϕ ∧ψ) ∈ P, that is,
T 6⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ). Thus ϕ and ψ are compatible by Claim 2.4.2. ⊣ (Claim 2.4.4)
Claim 2.4.5. G(A) is P-generic.
⊢ Working inM , suppose that Γ is a maximal antichain in P. By Claim 2.4.3,
we have |Γ | < κ and hence we have
∨∨
Γ ∈ Lλ(µ) and hence
∨∨
Γ ∈ P: For
ϕ ∈ Γ, since ϕ ∈ P we have T 6⊢ ¬ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→
∨∨
Γ. It follows T 6⊢
∨∨
Γ.
Moreover we have T ⊢
∨∨
Γ: Otherwise ¬
∨∨
Γ would be an element of P
incompatible with every ϕ ∈ Γ. A contradiction to the maximality of Γ.
Hence A |=
∨∨
Γ and thus there is ϕ ∈ Γ such that A |= ϕ. That is,
ϕ ∈ G(A). ⊣ (Claim 2.4.5)
(Lemma 2.4)
The proof of Theorem 2.3 from Lemma 2.4 relies on Lemma 2.2 and the
Axiom of Choice is involved both in the statement and the proof of Lemma 2.2.
On the other hand, Lemma 2.4 can be proved without assuming the Axiom
of Choice in M : It suffices to eliminate choice from the proof of Claim 2.4.5.
Proof of Claim 2.4.5 without the Axiom of Choice in M : Working in
M , suppose that D is a dense subset of P. Then A |=
∨∨
D: Otherwise we
would have T 6⊢
∨∨
D. Since
(2.15) T ⊢
∨∨
D ↔
∨∨
g(D),
it follows that T 6⊢
∨∨
g(D). Since
∨∨
g(D) ∈ Lλ(µ), this implies ¬
∨∨
g(D) ∈ P.
Since D is dense in P there is ϕ0 ∈ D such that T ⊢ ϕ0 → ¬
∨∨
g(D). By (2.15),
it follows that T ⊢ ϕ0 → ¬
∨∨
D. On the other hand, since ϕ0 ∈ D we have
T ⊢ ϕ0 →
∨∨
D. Hence we have T ⊢ ¬ϕ0 which is a contradiction to ϕ0 ∈ P.
Thus there is ϕ1 ∈ D such that A |= ϕ1, that is, ϕ1 ∈ G(A).
(Claim 2.4.5 without AC in M)
The next corollary follows immediately from this remark:
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Corollary 2.5. Work in NBG. Suppose that V is a model of ZFC and M is
an inner model of V (of ZF) such that M κ-globally covers V . If V = M [A]
for some set A ⊆ On then V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension of M .
We do not know if Corollary 2.5 is false without the added assumption that
V is M [A] for a set of ordinals A.
More generally, it seems to be open if there is a characterisation of the set-
generic extensions of an arbitrary model of ZF; or at least of such extensions
given by partial orders which are well-ordered in the ground model.
Grigorieff’s theorem can be also obtained by a modification of the proof of
Theorem 2.3.
Corollary 2.6 (S. Grigorieff [10]). Suppose that M is an inner model of a model
V of ZFC and V is a set-generic extension of M . Then any inner model N of
V (of ZFC) with M ⊆ N is a set-generic extension of M and hence definable
in V . Also, for such N , V is a set-generic extension of N .
If V is κ-c.c. set-generic extension of M in addition, then N is a κ-c.c.
set-generic extension of M and V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension of N .
Similarly to Theorem 2.3, we can also characterize generic extensions ob-
tained via a partial ordering of cardinality ≤ κ.
For M and V as above, we say that V is κ-decomposable into M if for any
a ∈ V with a ⊆M , there are ai ∈M , i ∈ κ such that a =
⋃
i<κ ai.
Theorem 2.7. Suppose that V is a transitive model of ZFC and M an inner
model of ZFC definable in V and κ is a cardinal in M . Then V is a generic
extension of M by a partial ordering in M of size ≤ κ (in M) if and only if M
κ+-globally covers V and V is κ-decomposable into M .
Proof. If V is a generic extension of M by a generic filter G over a partial
ordering P ∈ M of size ≤ κ (in M) then P has the κ+-c.c. and hence M κ+-
globally covers V by Theorem 2.1. V is κ-decomposable into M since, for any
a ∈ V with a = a˙G, we have a =
⋃
{{m ∈M : p ‖–P “m ∈ a˙ ”} : p ∈ G}.
Suppose now thatM κ+-globally covers V and V is κ-decomposable intoM .
By Theorem 2.3, there is a κ+-c.c. partial ordering P inM and a P-generic filter
G overM such that V = M [G]. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
P consists of the positive elements of a complete Boolean algebra B (in M).
By κ-decomposability, G can be decomposed into κ sets Gi ∈ M , i < κ.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that 1lP forces this fact. So letting
G˙ be the standard name of G and G˙i, i < κ be names of Gi, i < κ respectively,
we may assume
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(2.16) ‖–P “ G˙ =
⋃
i<κ G˙i ”.
Working inM , let Xi ⊆ P be a maximal pairwise incompatible set of conditions
p which decide G˙i to be Gi,p ∈ M for each i < κ. By the κ
+-c.c. of P, we
have |Xi | ≤ κ. Clearly, we have p ≤P
∏
B
Gi,p for all i < κ and p ∈ Xi. Let
P
′ =
⋃
{Xi : i < κ}. Then |P
′ | ≤ κ.
Claim 2.7.1. P′ is dense in P.
⊢ Suppose p ∈ P. Then there is q ≤ p such that q decides some G˙i to be Gi,q
and p ∈ Gi,q. Let r ∈ Xi be compatible with q. Then we have r ≤P
∏
B
Gi,r =∏
B
Gi,q ≤ p. ⊣ (Claim 2.7.1)
Thus V is a P′-generic extension over M . (Theorem 2.7)
3 A Formal deductive system for L∞(µ)
In the proof of Lemma 2.4, we used a formal deductive system of L∞(µ) without
specifying exactly which system we are using. It is enough to consider a system
of deduction which contains all logical axioms we used in the course of the proof
together with modus ponens and some infinitary deduction rules like:
ϕi → ψ, i ∈ I
∨∨
{ϕi : i ∈ I} → ψ
What we need for such a system is that its correctness and upward absoluteness
hold while we do not make use of any version of completeness of the system.
Formal deduction systems for infinitary logics have been studied extensively
in 1960s and 1970s, see e.g. [14], [15], [20]. Nevertheless, to be concrete, we
shall introduce below such a deductive system S for L∞(µ).
One peculiar task for us here is that we have to make our deduction system
S such that S does not rely on AC so that we can apply it in an inner model M
which does not necessarily satisfy AC to obtain Corollary 2.5.
Recall that we have introduced L∞(µ) as the smallest class containing the
sets 〈α, 0〉, α ∈ µ as the codes of the prediactes “α ∈ A˙” for α ∈ µ and closed
with respect to 〈ϕ, 1〉 for ϕ ∈ L∞(µ) and 〈Φ, 2〉 for all sets Φ ⊆ L∞(µ) where
〈ϕ, 1〉 and 〈Φ, 2〉 represent ¬ϕ and
∨∨
Φ respectively. Here, to be more precise
about the role of the infinite conjunction we add the infinitary logical connective∧∧
, and assume that
∧∧
Φ is coded by 〈Φ, 3〉 and thus L∞(µ) is also closed with
respect to 〈Φ, 3〉 for all sets Φ ⊆ L∞(µ).
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The axioms of S consist of the following formulas:
(A1) ϕ(ϕ0, ϕ1, ...,ϕn−1)
for each tautology ϕ(A0, A1, ...,An−1) of (finitary) propositional logic and
ϕ0, ϕ1,...,ϕn−1 ∈ L∞(µ);
(A2) ϕ→
∨∨
Φ and
∧∧
Φ→ ϕ
for any set Φ ⊂ L∞(µ) and ϕ ∈ Φ;
(A3) ¬(
∧∧
Φ)↔
∨∨
{¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ} and
¬(
∨∨
Φ)↔
∧∧
{¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ}
for any set Φ ⊆ L∞(µ); and
(A4) ϕ ∧ (
∨∨
Ψ)↔
∨∨
{ϕ ∧ ψ : ψ ∈ Ψ} and
ϕ ∨ (
∧∧
Ψ)↔
∧∧
{ϕ ∨ ψ : ψ ∈ Ψ}
for any ϕ ∈ L∞(µ) and any set Ψ ⊆ L∞(µ).
Deduction Rules:
(Modus Ponens)
{ϕ, ϕ→ ψ}
ψ
(R1)
{ϕ→ ψ : ϕ ∈ Φ}
∨∨
Φ→ ψ
(R2)
{ϕ→ ψ : ψ ∈ Ψ}
ϕ→
∧∧
Ψ
A proof of ϕ ∈ L∞(µ) from Γ ⊆ L∞(µ) is a labeled tree 〈T, f〉 such that
(3.1) T = 〈T,≤〉 is a tree growing upwards with its root r0 and T with (≤)
−1
is well-founded;
(3.2) f : T→ L∞(µ);
(3.3) f(r0) = ϕ;
(3.4) if t ∈ T is a maximal element then either f(t) ∈ Γ or t is one of the
axioms of S;
(3.5) if t ∈ T and P ⊆ T is the set of all immediate successors of t, then
{f(p) : p ∈ P}
f(t)
is one of the deduction rules.
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We have to stress here that, in (3.5), we do not assume that the function
f is one-to-one since otherwise we have to choose a proof for each formula in
the set in the premises of (R1) and (R2). Thus, for example, we can deduce
T ⊢
∧∧
Φ in S from T ⊢ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Φ without appealing to AC.
Now the proof of the following is an easy exercise:
Proposition 3.1. (1) For any B ⊆ µ, T ⊆ L∞(µ) and ϕ ∈ L∞(µ), if T ⊢ ϕ
and B |= T , then we have B |= ϕ.
(2) For transitive models M , N of ZF such that M is an inner model of N ,
if M |= “ 〈T, f〉 is a proof of ϕ in L∞(µ)”, then
N |= “ 〈T, f〉 is a proof of ϕ in L∞(µ)”.
Proof. (1): By induction on cofinal subtrees of a fixed proof 〈T, f〉 of ϕ. (2):
Clear by definition. (Proposition 3.1)
An alternative setting to the argument by means of a deductive system is
to make use of the following definition of M |= “Γ ⊢ ϕ” in the proof of Lemma
2.4:
M |= “Γ ⊢ ϕ” iff for any B ⊆ µ in some set-forcing extension M [G] of
M , M [G] |= B |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ always implies M [G] |= B |= ϕ.
Note that this is definable in M using the forcing relation definable on M .
It remains to verify that this notion has the desired degree of absoluteness.
Actually we can easily prove the full absoluteness, that is, if N is a transitive
model containing M with the same ordinals as those of M then, for Γ, ϕ ∈ M
with M |= Γ ⊆ L∞(µ) and M |= ϕ ∈ L∞(µ), Γ ⊢ ϕ holds in M iff Γ ⊢ ϕ holds
in N .
First suppose that B ⊆ µ is a set of ordinals in a set-generic extension N [G]
of N such that B witnesses the failure of Γ ⊢ ϕ in N . Let x be a real which is
generic over N for the Le´vy collapse of a sufficiently large ν to ω such that Γ and
µ become countable in the generic extension N [x]. Then x is also Le´vy generic
over M and M [x] is a submodel of N [x]. By Le´vy Absoluteness, it follows that
that there exists B′ ⊆ µ inM [x] which also witnesses the failure of Γ ⊢ ϕ inM .
Conversely, suppose that Γ ⊢ ϕ holds in N and let B ⊆ µ be a set of ordinals
in a set-generic extension M [G] of M such that B witnesses the failure of Γ ⊢ ϕ
in M . Then B also belongs to an extension of M which is generic for the Le´vy
collapse of sufficently large ν to ω; choose a condition p in this forcing which
forces the existence of such a B. Now if x is Le´vy-generic over N and contains
13
the condition p, we see that there is a counterexample to Γ ⊢ ϕ in N witnessed
in N [x], contrary to our assumption.
With both of the interpretations of ⊢ we can check that the arguments in
Section 2 go through.
4 An axiomatic framework for the set-generic multiverse
In this section, we consider some possible axiomatic treatments of the set-generic
multiverse. Such axiomatic treatments are also discussed e.g. in [9], [19], [22].
We introduce a conservative extension MZFC of ZFC in which we can treat
the multiverse of set-generic extensions of models of ZFC as a collection of
countable transitive models. This system or some further extension of it (which
can possibly also treat tame class forcings) may be used as a basis for direct
formulation of statements concerning the multiverse.
The language LMZF of the axiom system MZFC consists of the ǫ-relation
symbol ‘∈’, and a constant symbol ‘v’ which should represent the countable
transitive “ground model”.
The axiom system MZFC consists of
(4.1) all axioms of ZFC;
(4.2) “v is a countable transitive set”;
(4.3) “v |= ϕ” for all axioms ϕ of ZFC;
By (4.1), MZFC proves the (unique) existence of the closure M of “{v}”
under forcing extension and definable “inner model” of “ZF” (here ‘ZF’ is set
in quotation marks since we can only argue in metamathematics that such
“inner model” satisfies each instance of replacement). Note that M ⊆ Hℵ1 .
Here “inner model” is actually phrased in LZF as “transitive almost universal
subset closed under Go¨del operations”. If we had v |= ZFC, we would have
w |= ZF for any inner model w of v in this sense by Theorem 13.9 in [13]. In
MZFC, however, we have only v |= ϕ for each axiom ϕ of ZFC (in the meta-
mathematics). Nevertheless, for all such “inner model” w and hence for all
w ∈ M, we have w |= ϕ for all axiom ϕ of ZF by the proof of Theorem 13.9
in [13] and the Forcing Theorem. Apparently, this is enough to consider M in
this framework as the set-generic multiverse.
Similarly, we can also start from any extension of ZFC (e.g. with some ad-
ditional large cardinal axiom) and makeM closed under some more operations
such as some well distinguished class of class forcing extensions.
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The following theorem shows that we do not increase the consistency strength
by moving from ZFC to MZFC.
Theorem 4.1. MZFC is a conservative extension of ZFC: for any sentence ψ in
LZF, we have ZFC ⊢ ψ ⇔ MZFC ⊢ ψ. In particular, MZFC is equiconsistent
with ZFC.
Proof. “⇒” is trivial.
For “⇐”, suppose that MZFC ⊢ ψ for a formula ψ in LZF. Let P be a
proof of ψ from MZFC and let T be the finite fragment of ZFC consisting of all
axioms ϕ of ZFC such that v |= ϕ appears in P. Let Φ(x) be the formula in
LZF saying
“x is a countable transitive set and x |=
∧∧
T”.
By the Deduction Theorem, we can recast P to a proof of ZFC ⊢ ∀x(Φ(x) →
ψ). On the other hand we have ZFC ⊢ ∃xΦ(x) (by the Reflection Principle,
Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem and Mostowski’s Collapsing Theorem).
Hence we obtain a proof of ψ from ZFC alone. (Theorem 4.1)
It may be a little bit disappointing if each set-theoretic universe in the
multiverse seen from the “meta-universe” is merely a countable set. Of course
if M is an inner model of a model W of ZFC (i.e. M is a model which is a
transitive class ⊆ W and M , W |= ZFC) there are always partial ordering P
in M for which there is no (M,P)-generic set in W (e.g. any partial ordering
collapsing a cardinal of W cannot have its generic set in W ).
However, if we are content with a meta-universe which is not a model of full
ZFC, we can work with the following setting where each of the “elements” of
the set-generic multiverse is an inner model of a meta-universe: starting from
a model V of ZFC with an inaccessible cardinal κ, we generically extend it to
W = V [G] by Le´vy collapsing κ to ω1. LettingM = H(κ)
V , we have M |= ZFC
andM is an inner model ofW = H(κ)V [G] = H(ω1)
V [G]. W |= ZFC− the Power
Set Axiom and for any partial ordering P in M there is a (M,P)-generic set in
W . Thus an NBG-type theory of W with a new unary predicate corresponding
to M can be used as a framework of the theory for the set-generic multiverse
(which is obtained by considering all the set-generic grounds of M , and then all
the set generic extensions of them, etc.) as a “class” of classes in W . A setting
similar to this idea was also discussed in [19].
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5 Independent buttons
The multiverse view sometimes highlights problems which would be never asked
in the conventional context of forcing constructions. The existence of infinitely
many independent buttons which arose in connection with the characterization
of the modal logic of the set-generic multiverse (see [12]) is one such question.
A sentence ϕ in LZF is said to be a button (for set-genericity) if any set-
generic extension V [G] of the ground model V has a further set-generic extension
V [G][H ] such that ϕ holds in all set-generic extensions of V [G][H ]. Let us say
that a button ϕ is pushed in a set-generic extension V [G] if ϕ holds in all further
set-generic extensions V [G][H ] of V [G] (including V [G] itself).
Formulas ϕn, n ∈ ω are independent buttons, if ϕn, n ∈ ω are unpushed
buttons and for any set-generic extension V [G] of the ground model V and any
X ⊆ ω in V [G],
(5.1) if {n ∈ ω : V [G] |= ϕn is pushed} ⊆ X then there is a set-generic
extension V [G][H ] such that {n ∈ ω : V [G][H ] |= ϕn is pushed} = X .
In [12], it is claimed that formulas bn, n ∈ ω form an infinite set of inde-
pendent buttons over V = L where bn is a formula asserting: “ωn
L is not a
cardinal”. This is used to prove that the principles of forcing expressible in
the modal logic of the set-theoretic multiverse as a Kripke frame where modal
operator  is interpreted as:
(5.2) M |= ϕ⇔ in all set-generic extensionsM [G] ofM we haveM [G] |= ϕ
coincides with the modal theory S4.2 (Main Theorem 6 in [12]).
Unfortunately, it seems that there is no guarantee that (5.1) holds in an
arbitrary set-generic extension V [G] for these bn, n ∈ ω.
In the following, we introduce an alternative set of infinitely many formulas
which are actually independent buttons for any ground model of ZFC+ “GCH
below ℵω” + “ℵn = ℵ
L
n for all n ∈ ω” which can be used as bn, n ∈ ω in [12].
We first note that, for Main Theorem 6 in [12] we actually need only the
existence of an arbitrary finite number of independent buttons. In the case of
V = L the following formulas can be used for this: Let ψn be the statement
that ℵLn is a cardinal and the L-least ℵ
L
n-Suslin tree T
L
n in L (i.e., the L-least
normal tree of height ℵLn with no antichain of size ℵ
L
n in L) is still ℵ
L
n-Suslin. If
M is a set-generic (or arbitrary) extension of L in which the button ¬ψn has
not been pushed, then by forcing with TLn over M we push this button and do
not affect any of the other unpushed buttons ¬ψm, m 6= n, as this forcing is
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ℵn-distributive and has size ℵn. Rittberg [18] also found independent buttons
under V = L.
Now we turn to a construction of infinitely many independent buttons for
which we even do not need the existence of Suslin trees. For n ∈ ω, let ϕn be
the statement:
(5.3) there is an injection from ℵn+2
L to P(ℵn
L).
Note that ϕn is pushed in a set-generic extension V [G] if and only if it holds
in V [G]. Thus ϕn for each n ∈ ω is a button provided that ϕn does not hold
in the ground model. We show that these ϕn, n ∈ ω are independent buttons
(over any ground model where they are unpushed — e.g., when V = L).
Suppose that we are working in some model W of ZFC. In W , let A = {n ∈
ω : ϕn holds} and B ⊆ ω be arbitrary with A ⊆ B. It is enough to prove the
following
Proposition 5.1. We can force (over W ) that ϕn holds for all n ∈ B and ¬ϕn
for all n ∈ ω \B.
Proof. In W , let κn = | ℵn
L | for n ∈ ω. We use the notation of [16] on the
partial orderings with partial functions and denote with Fn(κ, λ, µ) the set of all
partial functions from κ to λ with cardinality < µ ordered by reverse inclusion.
By ∆-System Lemma, it is easy to see that Fn(κ, λ, µ) has the (λ<µ)+-c.c. Let
(5.4) Pn =
{
Fn(κn+2, 2, κn) if n ∈ B \ A
1l otherwise.
Let P =
∏
n∈ω Pn be the full support product of Pn, n ∈ ω. Then we clearly
have ‖–P “ϕn ” for all n ∈ B. Thus to show that P creates a generic extension
as desired, it is enough to show that ‖–P “¬ϕn ” for all n ∈ ω \B.
Suppose that
(5.5) n ∈ ω \B.
Then we have
(5.6) Pn = 1l.
Since ϕn does not hold in W , we have κn < κn+1 < κn+2 and 2
κn = κn+1 in
W . By (5.6), P factors as P ∼ P(< n) × P(> n) where P(< n) =
∏
k<n Pk and
P(> n) =
∏
k>n Pk.
We show that both P(> n) and P(< n) over P(> n) do not add any injection
from κn+2 into P(κn).
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P(> n) is κn+1-closed. Thus it does not add any new subsets of κn. So if it
added an injection from κn+2 into P(κn) then it would collapse the cardinal κn+2.
Since P(> n) further factors as P(> n) ∼ Pn+1 ×
∏
k>n+1 Pk and
∏
k>n+1 Pk is
κn+2-closed the only way P(> n) could collapse κn+2 would be if Pn+1 did so.
But then, since Pn+1 has the (2
<κn+1)+-c.c. with (2<κn+1)+ = (2κn)+, we would
have 2κn ≥ κn+2. This is a contradiction to the choice (5.5) of n. So P(> n)
forces ϕn to fail.
In the rest of the proof, we work in W P(>n) and show that P(< n) does
not add any injection from κn+2 into P(κn). Note that, by κn+1-closedness of
P(> n), we have Fn(κm+2, 2, κm)
W = Fn(κm+2, 2, κm)
W P(>n) for m < n.
We have the following two cases:
Case I. n − 1 ∈ A ∪ (ω \ B). Then P(< n) ∼ P(< m) for some m < n and
P(< m) has the (2κm−1)+-c.c. with (2κm−1)+ ≤ κn.
Case II. n− 1 ∈ B \ A. Then 2<κn−1 = κn and P(< n) has the κn+1-c.c.
In both cases the partial ordering P(< n) has κn+1-c.c. and hence the car-
dinals κn+1 and κn+2 are preserved. Since P(< n) has at most cardinality
2κn−1 · κn+1 = κn+1, it adds at most κn+1
κn = κn+1 new subsets of κn and thus
the size of P(κn) remains unchanged. This shows that ‖– P “¬ϕn ”.
(Proposition 5.1)
References
[1] Tatiana Arrigoni and Sy-David Friedman, Foundational implications of
the inner model hypothesis, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, Vol.163,
(2012), 1360–66.
[2] Tatiana Arrigoni and Sy-David Friedman, The hyperuniverse program,
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19, No.1, (2013), 77–96.
[3] Lev Bukovsky´, Characterization of generic extensions of models of set the-
ory, Fundamenta Mathematica 83 (1973), 35–46.
[4] Lev Bukovsky´, Generic Extensions of Models of ZFC, a lecture note of a
talk at the Novi Sad Conference in Set Theory and General Topology, Novi
Sad, August 18–21, (2014).
[5] Sy-David Friedman, Strict genericity, in Models, algebras and proofs, pro-
ceedings of the 1995 Latin American Logic Symposium, (1999), 129–139.
18
[6] Sy-David Friedman, Fine structure and class forcing, de Gruyter series in
logic and its applications, volume 3, (2000).
[7] Sy-David Friedman, Internal consistency and the inner model hypothesis,
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Vol.12, No.4, December (2006), 591–600.
[8] Gunter Fuchs, Joel David Hamkins and Jonas Reitz, Set Theoretic Geology,
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, Vol.166, Iss.4 (2015), 464–501.
[9] Victoria Gitman and Joel Hamkins, A natural model of the multiverse
axioms, Nortre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol.51, (4), (2010), 475–
484.
[10] Serge Grigorieff, Intermediate Submodels and Generic Extensions in Set
Theory, The Annals of Mathematics, Second Series, Vol. 101, No. 3 (1975),
447–490.
[11] Joel David Hamkins, The set-theoretical multiverse, Review of Symbolic
Logic, Vol.5, (2012), 416–449.
[12] Joel David Hamkins and Benedikt Lo¨we, The modal logic of forcing, Trans-
actions of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 360, No. 4, (2008),
1793–1817.
[13] Thomas Jech, Set Theory, The Third Millennium Edition, Springer
(2001/2006).
[14] Carol Karp, Languages with Expressions of Infinite Length, North-Holland,
(1964).
[15] H. Jerome Keisler, Model Theory for Infinitary Logic, North-Holland
(1974).
[16] Kenneth Kunen, Set Theory, An Introduction to Independence Proofs,
North-Holland (1980).
[17] Richard Laver, Certain very large cardinals are not created in small forcing
extensions, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 149 (2007) 1–6.
[18] Colin Jakob Rittberg, On the modal logic of forcing, Diploma Thesis,
(2010).
[19] John R. Steel, Go¨del’s program, in: Juliette Kennedy (ed.), Interpreting
Go¨del: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press (2014), 153–179.
19
[20] Gaishi Takeuti, Proof Theory, 2nd Ed., North-Holland, (1987).
[21] Toshimichi Usuba, The downward directed grounds hypothesis and large
large cardinals, preprint.
[22] Jouko Va¨a¨naa¨n, Multiverse Set Theory and Absolutely Undecidable Propo-
sitions, in: Juliette Kennedy (ed.), Interpreting Go¨del: Critical Essays,
Cambridge University Press (2014), 180–208.
[23] W.Hugh Woodin, Recent developments on Cantor’s Continuum Hypoth-
esis, on Proceedings of the Continuum in Philosophy and Mathematics,
2004, Carlsberg Academy, Copenhagen, November (2004).
[24] W.Hugh Woodin, The realm of the infinite, in: Michael Heller and
W.Hugh Woodin (eds.), Infinity: New research frontiers, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, (2011).
[25] W.Hugh Woodin, The Continuum Hypothesis, the generic multiverse of
sets, and the Ω conjecture, in: J. Kennedy and R. Kossak (eds.), Set theory,
arithmetic, and foundations of mathematics, ASL lecture notes in Logic,
Cambridge Univ. Press (2011), 13-42.
20
